Midway : Spruance and Fletcher…

Spruance and Fletcher…

just curious..I don't know if they were promoted by Nimitz as a result of winning the battle. Overall, they surely did well that day to earn their pay and rank.

Re: Spruance and Fletcher…

Nimitz didn't have the authority to promote admirals. He could recommend to Washington that they were promoted, and he did. Both, by the end of the year, received a third star and become Vice-Admirals.

However, after Midway they had very differing career paths.

Fletcher's promotion was only due to urging by Nimitz. Admiral Ernest J. King, the CNO, felt Fletcher was less than competent. At the Battle of Coral Sea he had sunk a small enemy carrier, the Shoho while almost missing the two large carriers in the same area -the Shokaku and Zuikaku. He was in the end, able to only damage one of them. Meanwhile he lost the Lexington and the Yorktown was badly damaged -as seen in the film.

At Midway, Fletcher seemed to get confused on the day of the battle. First he sent scouting planes to the north on June 4th. Recovering them meant he was delayed in launching his own planes at Nagumo's carriers. Then, he only launched HALF of his available planes, as he wanted to have some sort of reserve left. (Spruance sent all of his planes out, aside from fighters left to provide cover for the carriers.)

That meant there was only one squadron of planes from the Yorktown on hand when they reached the enemy carriers. The fourth carrier was in the distance but there were no planes left to go after it. If Fletcher had launched all his planes then -allowing a maximum punch- he might well have prevented the attacks the subsequently sunk the Yorktown. Again, he lost a carrier while not inflicting as much damage on the enemy as he could have. (And definitely not as much as Spruance did.)

The last straw for King was in August. Fletcher was put in charge of the Guadalcanal landings. He many times spoke out against the plan but didn't ask to be relieved of the job. He wound up pulling his carriers away sooner than he'd previously said, along with the transports -essentially leaving the Marines stranded on the island and short on equipment.

During the subsequent sea battles, Fletcher lost the carrier Wasp. Fletcher himself received a minor wound then (a gash to his forehead). It was enough of an excuse for King to relieve him and send him to command Northern Pacific forces for the rest of the war (essentially exhiling Fletcher to a backwater).

Spruance, on the other hand, became Nimitz's Chief of Staff after the battle. He then went on to take command of the Fifth Fleet (the main striking arm) during the Marianas Campaign, as well as during the Iwo Jima and Okinawa campaigns. Spruance led the fleet during the most critical actions of the war. By 1944, Nimitz's two most important subordinate admirals were Spruance and Halsey. And, of the two, Spruance was probably the one Nimitz had more faith in due to his cool decision making under the stress of battle. In fact, the relationship between the two was compared to that of Grant and Sherman during the Civil War.

Spruance received a fourth star by then and became a full Admiral.

Re: Spruance and Fletcher…

thanks for the post..

You know I've always thought that Admiral Spruance should have gotten much more recognition in winning that crucial battle at Midway. I'd wonder who the man in the street would say "won" the batlle of Midway. Nimitz? Fletcher? Spruance? I'd think Spruance's personality had something to do with it. Wasn't he the "Quiet Admiral" being very analytical and pensive? Much different than say Halsey who kind of worked on the seas by "feel." "Quiet" guys tend to be in the background. In any case, we had commanders at Midway who were the right call.

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Re: Spruance and Fletcher…

I know in my training as a naval officer the official U.S. Navy historians gave the main credit for the victory at the Battle of Midway to Spruance. And if you watch the movie it tends to give most of the credit to Spruance, played by Glenn Ford. Even Robert Webber, playing Fletcher, tended to show a fair amount of uncertainty in his portrayal.

Re: Spruance and Fletcher…

Yes, that's a great point. And some background regarding Spruance. I read he and Halsey had dinner with their wives in San Fran before WWII before the war broke out. At the time they were both in their 50's. At the dinner, Halsey asked Spruance what he would be if he could live his life again and Spruance
said, "A successful naval officer." What an understatement.

I've always felt that Fletcher kind of got the shaft on Midway…

He was, after all, the man in charge of all the Ameican naval forces. Spruance was just in charge of the Enterprise/Yorktown group. I'll stick my neck waaaayyy out here now, but I tend to think that while Spruance did a lot of things right at Midway, he was also very lucky.

You have to wonder. After the great victory, Spruance was the big hero. If a few things had changed, however, the battle might have gone completely the other way. It was so very close. If we had lost, who would have been the goat? I betcha that it would have been Fletcher that they came after.

It seems to me that Fletcher might have been given much more credit in the history books if he has acted a little differently in the Guadalcanal battles. He has been accused of being too cautious during Guadalcanal, which is funny because that is the charge you hear most often when someone is faulting Spruance. In my view, on those occasions when those two acted with caution, they were doing exactly what the need to do given the circumstances. Fletcher needed to protect his precious carriers at Guadalcanal, and Spruance knew he had to protect his beachhead at the Philippine Sea in lieu of chasing Japanese aircraft carriers.

In the end, I'm glad they cast a good actor like Robert Webber to play Fletcher. He didn't have the stature of Glen Ford, but the producers could have cast a nobody, or worse, a timid actor. Regardless of who you credit for the victory at Midway, both Spruance and Fletcher did well at the battle. If anything, Fletcher was lucky to have a guy like Spruance leading one of his sub-task forces.



"He was running around like a rooster in a barnyard full of ducks."--Pat Novak

Re: Spruance and Fletcher…

Spruance, who was already slated to be Nimitz's Chief of Staff, went back to sea in 1943 at C in C of the Central Pacific Force which was charged with the capture of the Marshalls, Carolines and the Marianas. The CPF would become the 5th Fleet under Spruance and the 3rd Fleet under Halsey. Spruance finished the war with the Iwo Jima and Okinawa Campaigns and his Fleet was not at Tokyo in September in case the Japanese tried any treachery during the surrender.

He ended up being promoted to full Admiral and was considered for the Navy's fourth Fleet Admiral (5-star), which was given to Halsey instead. Spruance was given full admiral's pay for life as compensation for not getting that fifth star. Senator Richard Lugar, who graduated from the same HS Spruance did in Indianapolis, entered legislation prior to the second Gulf War to retroactively promote Spruance to Fleet Admiral, but that dies because of the Gulf War.

After the War, Spruance became C in C of the Pacific Fleet and then President of the Naval War College. Later he was Ambassador of the Philippines, by Harry Truman and stayed on after Ike became President.

He settled in the Bay Area and is buried next to Admirals Chester Nimitz, Richmond Turner, and Charles Lockwood in Golden Gate National Cemetery in the Bay Area.

Despite not being an aviator, Spruance led the US Navy at Midway and Philippine Sea, two great carrier battles, to victory. At the latter, he kept his fleet in support of the landings at the Marianas (Siapan, Tinian, Guam), rather than chase the Japanese Fleet, and was heavily criticized in some circles. Halsey did the same thing at Leyte Gulf and left the landing exposed and if not for the gallant Taffy 3 and its escort carriers, that could have been disaster for the US forces.

In Who's who in Military History, written by John Keegan a Brit, considered Spruance "among the best fighting admirals ever." That would mean Nelson, Farragut, Dewey, Jellicoe, Hipper, Scheer, De Ruyter, de Grasse, Yi Sun Shin, Cunningham, Hawkins, et al, so that would be quite impressive.

He was played by Glenn Ford in Midway and GD Spradlin in the mini-series War and Remembrance. Both seemed to be good casting.

Re: Spruance and Fletcher…

Spruance showed good judgement, but was handicapped at Midway by modest experience in naval aviation and reliance on the over-rated Miles Browning.

The experienced Fletcher's handling of the Yorktown's air group was arguably much better. Yorktown placed a coordinated strike on the enemy (dive bombers and torpedo planes attacking simultaneously, escorted by fighters), something neither Hornet nor Enterprise managed to do. We should recall that Fletcher was in overall command of both task forces that morning.

But the Yorktown also happened to draw both Japanese counterattacks, leaving her crippled.

Live long and prosper.

Re: Spruance and Fletcher…

I agree FCG. Yorktown performed better than either of the other carriers at Midway, and Fletcher deserved some of the credit for that. Her loss was luck of the draw more than anything.

Fletcher did deserve some criticism for some of his actions at Guadalcanal, but that doesn't detract from his performance at Midway.

Re: Spruance and Fletcher…

Wow. Some people out there actually agree with me on this point! Generally, any time I stand up for Fletcher, I go down in flames faster than a TBD...

Both of you make good points. Spruance had the good fortune to be in a task force that was never attacked, while Fletcher's Yorktown group was repeatedly attacked. An yes, if you look at the performance of Yorktown's air group, you can easily make the argument that they did a better job than either of the other carriers.

Glad you guys chimed in.



"He was running around like a rooster in a barnyard full of ducks."--Pat Novak

Re: Spruance and Fletcher…

Fletcher's biggest mistake at Midway, IMO, was not launching VS-5 when he learned that VB-3 had found and attacked the Japanese carriers. It would have not prevented the Japanese dive bomber attack, but it could have stopped the later torpedo attack that really crippled the Yorktown. Even if the Hiryu was only damaged and not sunk, it would have allowed Enterprise and Hornet dive bombers to follow-up.

Instead, he sent VS-5 out to scout for the last carrier. It would have been a risk, but knowing the general area of where VB-3 attacked the carrier force would have given a concentrated VS-5 a starting point and a radius of search for the carriers who were about 1 hours flight time from the Yorktown.

At Guadalcanal, Fletcher did make some bad decisions that lacked aggressiveness IMO.

Redhooks

"You don't get something for nothing, you don't get freedom for free." Neil Peart

Re: Spruance and Fletcher…

When you talk about the possibility of Yorktown NOT sinking, it reminds me of one of my favorite "What Ifs?"

When you look at the four U.S. carriers that were sunk during 1942, at least two of them very easily might have avoided sinking except for some bad luck. I think that it is very likely that if Yorktown could have avoided the Japanese sub that sunk her, she would have made it back to Pearl Harbor (under tow.) I've always thought that it was fairly remarkable that the sub found her and was able to penetrate her screen. It it a tribute to Yorktown's damage control team that she took so much damage over the course of two battles, practically back-to-back, and still managed to stay afloat (except for the intervention of the sub.)

Likewise, Lexington was doing very well after sustaining damage at Coral Sea, and would have survived that battle were it not for the ill-advised decision to turn on the fans and spread the gas fumes all over the ship. That ship was designed as a battle cruiser, and had considerable armor. If I'm not mistaken, she had an armored belt that was a much as 7" thick. Saratoga, her sister, survived several torpedo hits without too much trouble.

Hornet might have been saved given a slightly different scenario, and even then she had to be sunk by friendly ships.

If you really want to play this game, if Wasp had been handled with a little more care, she never would have been torpedoed. I've read several accounts which fault her handling prior to the Japanese sub attack. As it was, I believe she took three torpedos and of all the US carriers sunk her fate was the most certain from the moment she was hit.

Many writers, especially British writers, fault American carrier design for their light construction. There is probably truth to the criticism, but when you consider USN carrier record after 1942, the ships held up pretty well. Bunker Hill, Franklin, and even Enterprise were badly damaged by kamikaze hits, but all survived--in part due to damage control lessons learned in 1942.

But anyway, I've always thought it was interesting that given very small changes, we may have never lost the carriers that we did lose. For the most part, the Japanese carriers that were sunk were blown out of the water. Just an observation.

"He was running around like a rooster in a barnyard full of ducks."--Pat Novak

Re: Spruance and Fletcher…

Hornet also had a chance, until her third torpedo hit.

Live long and prosper.

Re: Spruance and Fletcher…

In Who's who in Military History, written by John Keegan a Brit, considered Spruance "among the best fighting admirals ever." That would mean Nelson, Farragut, Dewey, Jellicoe, Hipper, Scheer, De Ruyter, de Grasse, Yi Sun Shin, Cunningham, Hawkins, et al, so that would be quite impressive.

Anybody care to take a stab at how both Spruance and Fletcher are viewed today?
Shoul they have received say more accolades for their win? Both were involved in a battle which had great consequences for ultimately in the long run the existence of the United States yet sometimes I think they aren't getting their full due. Midway was an extremely fluid and complicated battle. Really the worst to have at that time for the US. Under the circumstances sometimes I think it's crazy to criticize the admirals in hindsight considering the kind of fight it was. Fact is both Spruance and Fletcher HAD to win. The pressure had to be unbelievable on those commanders. So what did they do? They carried out orders, did their duty and won. Only thing is we will never know the angst they lived under facing either a win or a defeat.

Re: Spruance and Fletcher…

One other factor to remember is that until the Enterprise returned to Pearl at the end of May, right before being sent back out to Midway, Nimitz had intended for Vice-Admiral Halsey to command the battle. As he had three stars, he was the ranking Task Force commander and was the most experienced of the carrier admirals.

It was only when Halsey reported to Nimitz's office and Nimitz got a look at him, that he realized Halsey had to go to the hospital. (In reality, Nimitz ordered him to the hospital rather than Halsey checking himself in.) Incidentally, in reality Nimitz agreed without hesitation to Halsey's recommendation that Spruance take command of TF-16.

If Halsey had been healthy, it's certain that the U.S. fleet would have been even more aggressive. Halsey might well have ordered Fletcher to launch ALL aircraft for the first strike. With VS-5 joining in the attack, the Hiryu might well have been sunk or damaged in the morning flight, thus potentially saving the Yorktown.

On the flip-side, Halsey could let his agressive desire to join in battle drive him to mistakes. During the night of June 4-5 he may have pursued the Japanese far west enough that they could have come under attack from either the Main Body of battleships and heavy cruisers that Yamamoto was leading (and during a night attack, the carriers would have been unable to launch aircraft) and where they'd be outnumbered and outgunned. Or, brought them within range of Wake Island and the enemy air forces located there.

Spruance was wise enough not to go too far west at night when his best weapon -his flight decks- were not operating. Instead, he stayed close to Midway, to make sure it wasn't attacked from another direction (i.e. Kondo's invasion force)

Overall, I think Fletcher suffers in comparison to Spruance because he seemed to always underachieve. At the Coral Sea, the small Shoho was sunk while the two big carriers got away, while he lost the Lexington. Then, at Midway, his decision to not launch an all out attack seemed overly cautious, followed by the loss of the Yorktown. And in comparison, Spruance who'd never served on a carrier before, was able to win the battle. Finally, there was his actions at Guadalcanal that effectively ended his fighting career.

Re: Spruance and Fletcher…

Fletcher was cautious at Midway because of the issue of launching a large strike at the Shoho at Coral Sea. In doing a little more research, it is not clear that Fletcher received any info from any of the strike planes that had mortally damaged 3 of the 4 Japanese carriers. He had only the report from the PBY earlier in the morning about 2 carriers. I think now it was just bad luck for Fletcher to have only this information and due to what happened at Coral Sea, it made him cautious that there may be 2 separate groups of Japanese carriers.

He had to wait until his strike planes returned before learning of all 4 carriers operating together. Had he launched a strike force instead of a scouting mission at the time before the Japanese dive bomber attack, they still would have not reached the Hiryu before it launched its torpedo plane attack. VS-5 had to be launched within 30 minutes of the US dive bomber attacks on the Japanese carriers to prevent the Japanese torpedo attack on the Yorktown. Better radio communications might have made the battle more one-sided for the US than what actually happened.

Just think of a repaired and overhauled Yorktown participating in the Guadalcanal campaign sometime starting in September? The Battle of Santa Cruz would have been 3 US fleet carriers versus 2 Japanese fleet and 1 light carrier instead of the 2 vs.2/1 as it was in reality. It might then have been a much different result with the Hornet not being sunk and possibly either the Shokaku or Zuikaku being damaged or even sunk.

A lot of what ifs I know, but it is only an academic debate.

Redhooks

"You don't get something for nothing, you don't get freedom for free." Neil Peart

Re: Spruance and Fletcher…

Your post, Redhooks, reminds me of something I have frequently brought up over the last 30 years--an idea which goes over like a lead balloon with almost everyone I've talked with. I'm curious what you (or anyone else) might think about my argument.

The fact is, in the aftermath of Midway, had I been King and Nimitz, I would have stayed on the strategic defensive. There is no way I would have taken Guadalcanal. The reason always put forward by historians for taking Guadalcanal is that a Japanese airfield there would have threatened the shipping lanes to Australia. I think this threat has been vastly overstated. Such an airfield might have forced allied shipping to move further south, but it would have made it to Australia all the same. The simple fact is that King, in particular, wanted his share of war resources--most of which were going to the European Theater--and the only way he could get them was to force the fight against Japan. Guadalcanal did this in spades.

Had, as you postulate, Yorktown (or Lexington for that matter) survived to this point in the war, I might feel differently. But if you study the Guadalcanal battles you can see that we came within a whisker of getting our butts kicked off the island. Furthermore, we could easily have lost Enterprise in addition to Hornet and Wasp, leaving the US Fleet in an awful position.

On the other hand, had Hornet and Wasp survived into 1943, which I assume would have happened sans Guadalcanal, the Pacific Fleet would have been in position to start its Central Pacific offensive earlier. In retrospect, we did win in the Solomons, and the pool of experienced Japanese pilots was bled dry as they attempted to hold their positions in these islands--which ultimately did much to advance our cause in the Pacific.

Never-the-less, I believe that the potential for all-out disaster at Guadalcanal far out-weighed the advantages of attacking there in 1942. It's hard to argue against success. You cannot dispute the incredible heroism shown by the Navy and Marines at Guadalcanal. But was it a good move? I don't think so. Too much risk when measured against the reward. But that is just my opinion.

"He was running around like a rooster in a barnyard full of ducks."--Pat Novak

Re: Spruance and Fletcher…

I tend to agree with Admiral King about allowing the Japanese to complete the airfield on Guadalcanal. Not only would have they base long range recon and bomber aircraft, they would have used it for their planned invasion of the Fijis and New Hebrides in September.

I think what was wrong with the Guadalcanal campaign was it could have been delayed 7 to 10 days and there would not have been much difference. As long as the airfield wasn't completed, then the Marines could have taken it and turned it around quicker for Marine planes to be brought in. The Marine planes were being ferried by the USS Long Island and it did not get in position to launch the aircraft until Aug. 20 or 21st I believe.

What this delay could have been used for was for the various commanders to have a longer meeting in Noumea with Vice Admiral Ghormley. He should have made the final decision as to when Fletcher should leave the area of the island with his carrier force. If 4 days were needed until the Marines own aircraft would arrive then that is what should have been done. Admirals Fletcher, Turner, McCain, and the British admiral commanding the transport screening force would know much better what was needed. This being the 1st amphibious landing for the US, it showed that there needed to be vast improvement in how to move supplies from the transport ships to the island. There was a big learning curve that I think would have been smaller had there been more time to plan the operation.

My biggest question is where was the US submarine force during the first week of the Guadalcanal operation? Why were they not used to intercept (or at least warn of) Japanese warships coming from Rabaul? The admirals had to know the Japanese would do more than just send air attacks and yet their dispositions of the night of August 8 were terrible.

As far as starting the Central Pacific campaign earlier, I don't think we had the manpower in Marine or Army infantry to start earlier. What might have been done was a carrier strike at Rabaul or even Truk in early 1943 instead of waiting until the fall of 1943 and spring of 1944, respectively.

Redhooks

"You don't get something for nothing, you don't get freedom for free." Neil Peart

Re: Spruance and Fletcher…

Never-the-less, I believe that the potential for all-out disaster at Guadalcanal far out-weighed the advantages of attacking there in 1942.

Interesting assessment! If I was on staff as you made that remark boy I don't know what I'd say!..;-)...

In any case, I'm figuring the naval staff's assessment of Guadalcanal and what had to be done at the time probably followed some of that "Mahanian" strategic thinking which influenced practically all naval powers in the 19th and 20th centuries. I've read that the Japanese in the late 30's spent much on modernizing their fleet and merchant fleet but never really took account of their sea lines of communication. In naval theory this is crucial. Now arguably for the US Pacific Fleet it wasn't so much controlling "oceans" but rather denying "sea-lanes" to the Japanese in their conduct of the war. With that macro-look, I'd think that would be intuitively hovering in arguments when it came to the Guadalcanal theater strategic deliberations.

And regarding the submarines I'd think that they were very instrumental in helping to defeat Japan since they interdicted and isolated the Japanese islands from raw materials and resources in the conquered territories.

Re: Spruance and Fletcher…

The idea of sitting back and not taking Guadalcanal is intriguing. Of course, that campaign worked out for the US, but was a close-run thing that easily could have gone either way.

Guadalcanal gave the US Navy a chance to get valuable experience in surface warfare. Costly mistakes like Savo Island teach hard lessons, and the US Navy needed those lessons. We got the chance to try everything from PT boats to battleships, and also submarines, carriers, and land-based aircraft in a continuous tactical setting. We went into the Solomons as naive rookies ready to get our butts kicked, and came out experts ready to dominate the Japanese at their best game (contrast Savo Island and Cape St. George).

The Solomons fighting also ruined Japanese naval aviation. They were compelled to commit their best naval pilots to the attrition in the Solomons, so that in 1944, their carriers were manned by mostly green pilots.

So the benefits of taking Guadalcanal went beyond just the airfield at Lunga Point.

Live long and prosper.

Re: Spruance and Fletcher…

I have been wanting to read it, finally got it, and have been sidetracked into NOT reading it for some time now. I really have to get off my a$$ and read the damn thing.

"Neptune's Inferno: The US Navy at Guadalcanal" By James D. Hornfischer.
At home with a sore back today, maybe I'll start reading it again. (am only in the opening background phase of the book, the first couple of chapters.

Back when I was aboard USS Halsey,
Passing over Iron Bottom Sound and passing between Savo and Guadalcanal on the 50th anniversary of those events, just thinking of all those hulks lying beneath us... was very sobering.

I joined the Navy to see the world, only to discover the world is 2/3 water!

Re: Spruance and Fletcher…

"Neptune's Inferno: The US Navy at Guadalcanal" By James D. Hornfischer.
At home with a sore back today, maybe I'll start reading it again. (am only in the opening background phase of the book, the first couple of chapters.

I sure hope you like that book cgsailor..one of the best now in my library.

Re: Spruance and Fletcher…

It is a good one.

My favorite read on Guadalcanal is Guadalcanal: Starvation Island. The most informative I know of is Richard Frank's book.

Neptune's Inferno ranks close to those.

I have at least a few others (Hamil's other two works and an older one that excels mainly in weapon diagrams). I used to have Hoyt's book on Guadalcanal and another on the Solomons, but I suspect I discarded those when I figured out Hoyt is a lousy historian.


Live long and prosper.

Re: Spruance and Fletcher…

His other book, Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors has a place of pride on my Bookshelf, Everyone tells me Neptune's Infernal is just as good. Just can't get motivated to read it for some reason. (Like today, I was supposed to start reading, since my post all I did was take some Painkillers and sleep)


I joined the Navy to see the world, only to discover the world is 2/3 water!

Re: Spruance and Fletcher…


Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors


Hmmm... Maybe I should get that one... Thanks.

Live long and prosper.

Re: Spruance and Fletcher…

You won't be disappointed.

I have never seen someone bring a battle to life like Hornfischer does.

He literally puts you on the deck of those small DD and DE's as those monstrous BB shells come ripping out of the air like crazed freight trains.

The battle is so vivid to the reader, it really brings home the full impact of CDR Ernest Evans' words to his crew when the Japanese was first sighted;

"A large Japanese fleet has been contacted. They are fifteen miles away and headed in our direction. They are believed to have four battleships, eight cruisers, and a number of destroyers. This will be a fight against overwhelming odds from which survival cannot be expected. We will do what damage we can."


I joined the Navy to see the world, only to discover the world is 2/3 water!

Re: Spruance and Fletcher…

I found that one by Hornfischer to be real good as well. And as far as Guadalcanal any recs on a book about the campaign? Thanks ahead.

Re: Spruance and Fletcher…

Totally agree with your assessment about the Solomons Campaign as the learning crucible the US Navy needed for surface tactics of cruisers and destroyers. The doctrine and tactics derived from that campaign ended the last Japanese superiority of naval doctrine and training in World War 2 in my opinion. Night fighting by the end of the campaign had become a strength instead of a weakness for the US Navy.

One question that I have that I really have never seen adressed in any book that I have read is why no older battleships were used by the US in this campaign? I haven't by far read every book or article about the campaign, but in the desperate days of September and October 1942 when the US only commited heavy cruiser or smaller ships to the surface force, couldn't have one or two older battleships that weren't at Pearl Harbor on Dec. 7 have been used? The Japanese used their World War 1 and early 1920's era battleships in the campaign, why not the US? Was the Japanese land based airpower that feared or could have been just logistics problems with fuel oil?

Just think if an American task force with BBs had been in near Guadalcanal on October 23/24 when the worst Japanese BB shelling of Henderson Field occurred. Would have the results been similar to Savo Island or the Naval battle in November with the Washington and South Dakota sinking the Kirishima?

Discuss.

Redhooks

"You don't get something for nothing, you don't get freedom for free." Neil Peart

Re: Spruance and Fletcher…


One question that I have that I really have never seen adressed in any book that I have read is why no older battleships were used by the US in this campaign? I haven't by far read every book or article about the campaign, but in the desperate days of September and October 1942 when the US only commited heavy cruiser or smaller ships to the surface force, couldn't have one or two older battleships that weren't at Pearl Harbor on Dec. 7 have been used? The Japanese used their World War 1 and early 1920's era battleships in the campaign, why not the US? Was the Japanese land based airpower that feared or could have been just logistics problems with fuel oil?


Perhaps the old battleships were not committed because of their slow speed? This made them relatively vulnerable to Japanese bombers, such as G4Ms flying out of Rabaul. Low speed meant they could not clear Japanese bomber range quickly after a night battle and also made them easier to hit.

Live long and prosper.

Re: Spruance and Fletcher…

The seas in and around Guadalcanal were considered inappropriate for battleships by the U.S. Navy. If you look at a map of the Solomons, it makes sense. Battleships require a lot of room to operate at peak efficiency. Their big guns (and the way they were armored) were designed to slug it out with other battleships at long distance. The Navy knew that the surface fights in and around Guadalcanal would be up-close affairs. Battleships would be much more vulnerable to torpedos in these tight confines, and their armor, which was designed to protect against long-range plunging fire would not be very effective.

The decision to send in the Washington and South Dakota on the second day of the Battle of Guadalcanal was taken as a measure of desperation as almost all of the available cruisers had been either sunk or badly damaged. (Look up the American cruiser loses in mid-to-late '42. Ouch!)

Given the Japanese successes with their Long Lance torpedos up until that point, I don't at all blame Adm. Halsey for thinking twice about sending in these two battleships. If you ask me, it was incredibly lucky that neither of these ships was hit with a torpedo, especially given their marginal destroyer screen.

I had also wondered about why none of the older battleships were used at Guadalcanal until I read about these considerations. Later in the war, during Leyte Gulf, these older battleships were used to guard a strait (Surigao?) in very confined waters and they kicked the crap out of a couple of Japanese battleships, so you have to wonder. At that battle, however, they did have a lot more support than was available at Guadalcanal.

"He was running around like a rooster in a barnyard full of ducks."--Pat Novak

Re: Spruance and Fletcher…


At that battle, however, they did have a lot more support than was available at Guadalcanal.


Indeed. That included multiple squadrons of radar-equipped destroyers with torpedoes that worked, and adequate training in night combat.

Live long and prosper.

Re: Spruance and Fletcher…

Just an aside. I just read an obit on an Army Air services veteran who fought at Midway. Name is James Muri, 94 years. He was noted for valor at the battle. The veteran group of Midway I'm sure is getting pretty small now.

Re: Spruance and Fletcher…

I understand the reluctance to use the older BBs in confined waters, but has there been any documentation that anyone has read that either Nimitz or Halsey specifically did not want them there? I have seen on the wikipedia pages for the USS Colorado and USS Maryland that in early November 1942 they were being used to patrol the seas around Fiji in case the Japanese went ahead and attacked that island group. I just thought that being relatively close, they could have been used if necessary.

Also on those ship's info pages, they both had been either repaired and overhauled or just overhauled on the West Coast that took until after August 1942 and that is why they probably were not included in the bombardment force for Guadalcanal. I noticed that no BBs were used in the Solomons as far as I have read for shore bombardment prior to an amphibious landing. Not until the invasion of the Gilbert Islands in November 1943 did the old BBs constantly carry out shore bombardments through the rest of the Pacific War.

Redhooks

"You don't get something for nothing, you don't get freedom for free." Neil Peart

Re: Spruance and Fletcher…


Not until the invasion of the Gilbert Islands in November 1943 did the old BBs constantly carry out shore bombardments through the rest of the Pacific War.


There was at least one earlier than that. Tennessee and Idaho shelled Kiska in August 1943. They did not know the Japanese had already left.

Live long and prosper.

Re: Spruance and Fletcher…

Yes you are correct. I had forgotten about that. But there was little chance of a large Japanese land-based air attack in the Aleutians. Very different than anywhere in the Solomon Island area.

Redhooks

"You don't get something for nothing, you don't get freedom for free." Neil Peart

Re: Spruance and Fletcher…

I understand the reluctance to use the older BBs in confined waters, but has there been any documentation that anyone has read that either Nimitz or Halsey specifically did not want them there? I have seen on the wikipedia pages for the USS Colorado and USS Maryland that in early November 1942 they were being used to patrol the seas around Fiji in case the Japanese went ahead and attacked that island group. I just thought that being relatively close, they could have been used if necessary.

I was going to suggest that this was probably in keeping with Pacific naval command that there was a premium on the use of ships during that time. If I'm not mistaken the US was stretched kind of thin in that theater. I know after Midway the US got more "offensive" but I think we were a bit cautious, i.e in a defensive mind set after Midway even though the battle was won. It appeared naval command thought we should be more deliberative in the use of materiel when engaging the Japanese.

Re: Spruance and Fletcher…

If you read Neptune's inferno, it indicates that the primary reason the old battleships were not more heavily involved in the solomons was due to critical shortage of tankers. German submarines sank a significant number of tankers in the Atlantic, which caused an overall shortage in tankers until new production could catch. The US pacific fleet had less than 10 tankers to supply the entire fleet. This limited the number and type of ships that could operate out of Noumea. The Old BB's used a lot of fuel, more than the newer BB's did. So most of the old BB's were kept close to the large fuel storage tanks in Hawaii and the US west coast.

I believe some of the old bb's did eventually operate in the vicinity of the Solomons after the fuel situation eased, shortly after the second naval battle of Guadalcanal.

Re: Spruance and Fletcher…

Guadalcanal also was valuable for experience against the Japanese in land warfare. The 1st Marine Division landed in August as a division of primarily new men fresh from boot camp. It left in December as a blooded, hardened fighting unit -and many of its officers and men were sent to new formations to share the benefit of their experience.

I think that U.S. land forces encountering and -eventually- defeating Japanese forces at that stage in the war was invaluable both to American morale and tactical doctrine. For morale, all previous ground combat with the Japanese had been defeats (Guam, Wake Island, Bataan, Corregidor, etc.) where all American personnel were either killed or captured. Guadalcanal showed the American people (both military and civilian) that they could indeed outfight the Japanese on land. It also taught the U.S. Marines and Army just how bloody and intense island warfare was going to be and thus, how they should prepare for it.

Guadalcanal was -in a way- much like the invasion of North Africa in the ETO. It was an opportunity for U.S. forces to get into action, in an offensive action, in 1942 and give them an opportunity to gain invaluable battle experience. (Don't forget that the invasion of the island was initially planned out as a relatively minor action. It was only later that it escalated.)
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